Password Managers
Passwords stored in a central vault, which may have some weaknesses depending on your target
Last updated
Passwords stored in a central vault, which may have some weaknesses depending on your target
Last updated
While typing out the master key to unlock a KeePass database, the value of the input box is stored in memory. While it is visually hidden using '●' characters, the last character was briefly visible in memory and stored there (CVE-2023-3278, fixed in KeePass 2.54 released June 3rd 2023). That makes it possible to find strings like the following in a memory dump:
Dumps can be created of a vulnerable version using the following command on a Windows machine:
Then, use a tool to parse and extract the leaks from the memory dump:
When the Bitwarden browser extension is installed on a compromised machine, it is often still locked and requires the master password to be entered to decrypt the data. There is an option however to lock the vault with a PIN instead of a password, either always or only after the master password has been entered once.
You can imagine that passwords must be less protected because the only thing required to unlock the vault now is a 4-digit number. It still works offline meaning that the decryption can always be replicated without limits to brute-force the PIN. While Bitwarden tries its best to make it slow to crack such a PIN, there are only 10000 options which can be done in a few minutes even for slow password hashes.
To exploit all possible scenarios confidently and efficiently, I made a multi-threaded brute-forcing tool that takes the hash and configuration options and cracks the Bitwarden PIN. See the README.md file for detailed usage instructions:
